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2.1  Economic Development, Nominal Wage Flexibility, and 
Antebellum Labor Markets 
America experienced several expansions and contractions in economic ac- 
tivity between its founding and the Civil War. The Embargo of 1807 abruptly 
ended the export boom of the Napoleonic Wars, a recession followed the War 
of 1812, there was a panic in 1819, and a crisis in 1825. An expansion in the 
late  1820s and early  1830s gave way  to several downturns; rapid  recovery 
succeeded the first, a minor one in  1837, but the second, in 1839, was more 
prolonged.  Minor contractions  in the late  1840s and early  1850s were fol- 
lowed by  another downturn in  1857. Associated with most of these expan- 
sions and contractions,  especially the so-called Panic of  1837 and Panic of 
1857, were  sharp changes  in the price level.  While the  existence of these 
fluctuations in economic activity is not in doubt, their severity has been ques- 
tioned. 
There are two opposing views of the antebellum economy. One is that the 
period was marked by at least one severe depression, from 1839 to 1843, and 
other lesser recessions. Aggregate economic activity, according to this view, 
was severely diminished during the downturns, and unemployment was both 
substantial and prolonged in cities and industrial towns. The other interpreta- 
The wage data analyzed in this paper were collected by the Center for Population Economics, 
University of Chicago. The research assistance of Joseph Hunt and research support from Colgate 
University are gratefully  acknowledged.  The authors  would like to thank Stanley Engerman, 
Kevin Hassett, Hugh Rockoff, and the participants at the 1990 NBER-DAE Summer Institute, the 
1990 AEA-Cliometrics session, and the Cornell University economic history seminar for com- 
ments on an earlier draft. 
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tion is that antebellum fluctuations were more apparent than real; more often 
only prices,  not quantities,  changed. Furthermore,  whatever unemployment 
may have been created did not endure for long; the unemployed, particularly 
laborers, teamsters, and other unskilled workers, migrated to the countryside 
and returned to industry when conditions turned more favorable. 
According to the proponents of the first view, antebellum price changes are 
evidence  of  serious  and  sustained  economic  hardship.  Price  fluctuations 
could have influenced real magnitudes if the antebellum wage lag was long. 
Real wages would then have decreased during periods of inflation, such as the 
mid-1  830s, thereby sparking strikes and union activity. And real wages would 
have increased during periods of  deflation, such as the early 1840s. Thus de- 
flationary periods would have led to or been associated with unemployment. 
Labor market adjustment would have occurred largely through changes in em- 
ployment, a real variable, rather than wages, a nominal variable. 
Newspaper and other narrative accounts attest to considerable unemploy- 
ment in cities following the Embargo of  1807, the Panic of  1837, and espe- 
cially during the deflation  of  the early  184Os, and have led one historian to 
state that “more than  half of New  York’s craft workers  reportedly  lost their 
jobs in the immediate wake of  the panic” of  1837.2 Many have claimed that 
artisans, in particular, were thrown out of employment during the well-known 
economic crises of  1837, 1839, and  1857, and that unemployment in general 
was high throughout the 1839 to 1842 period and during 1854 and 1855. But 
if  deflation fostered unemployment,  inflation  must  have caused  strikes and 
other union  activity, as many have documented for the mid-1830s  and, to a 
lesser extent, in the  1850~.~  The end result-inconstancy  of work and dis- 
tressed labor relations-were,  according to many labor histories, the common 
ground around which working-class life, culture,  and politics  were shaped, 
and a dominant element in the emergence of working-class consciousness.4 
But according to a revisionist view, even the most severe antebellum price 
fluctuations had little impact on aggregate real activity and employment. “The 
parallel between the 1840s and the 1930s,” writes Peter Temin, “extends only 
to the monetary aspects of the economy. . . . Farmers, textile workers, and 
1.  See, for example, John R. Commons, et al., History  of  Labor in  the United States (New 
York, 1916); William Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840 (Harrisburg, 
1955); Norman Ware, The Industrial  Worker, 1840-1860  (New York, 1924); Susan E. Hirsch, 
Roots of  the American  Working Class: The Industrialization  of Crafts in  Newark, 1800-1860 
(Philadelphia, 1978); Bruce Laurie, Working People of  Philadelphia, 1800-1850  (Philadelphia, 
1980); Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working 
Class. 1788-1850  (New York, 1984); Steven J. Ross, Workers on  the Edge: Work, Leisure, and 
Politics in Industrializing Cincinnati, 1788-1890  (New York,  1985); and Robert W.  Fogel, With- 
out Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of  American Slavery (New York, 1989). 
2. Wilentz, Chants Democratic, p. 294. 
3. Commons, et al., History of  Labor; Stanley Lebergott, Manpower  in  Economic Growth 
4. See especially Laurie, Working People; and Wilentz, Chants Democratic. 
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others found their money wages reduced.  They were not unemployed,  how- 
ever, and their real incomes may not have fallen.”5 
The revisionist view  is rooted in the belief that antebellum labor markets 
functioned like their textbook counterparts. Real wages, in the short and long 
runs, were the outcomes of real forces: the supply and demand for labor. A 
purely nominal shock-an  unexpected increase in the money supply-would 
be swiftly followed by higher nominal wages, leaving no persistent deviation 
from the long-run growth path of real wages. The same would be true of real 
shocks. A permanent increase in labor productivity-caused,  for example, by 
the introduction of  the factory system-would  result in a permanent increase 
in real wages but no permanent  disequilibrium between  wages and produc- 
tivity. 
We evaluate the revisionist view using an indirect method that measures the 
persistence of  shocks to real wages. Short-run persistence is indicated by the 
degree to which the time-series properties of real wages deviate from those of 
a stochastic process following a deterministic trend, which measures the long- 
run path, plus a white-noise error. Long-run persistence is indicated by a “unit 
root” in real wages, which means that any shock today affects the expectation 
of the wage in the distant future. We test for a unit root using classical statis- 
tical  procedures  and  measure  its  importance  using  a  non-parametric  tech- 
nique. 
Our results support a weak version of the revisionist model. In the long run, 
shocks to real wages eventually vanished, that is, the so-called random-walk 
component of real wages was small. But shocks had persistent effects on real 
wages in the short run, lasting as long as five years. The degree of persistence 
varied across occupations and regions.  Persistence was less for agricultural 
and  unskilled  non-farm  labor  than  for artisans  and  clerks, and  less in the 
emerging  Midwest  than in  the older Northeast or the  South.  Although  our 
study  concerns the  antebellum  period,  we  also report provisional  evidence 
that shocks to real wages were more persistent in the late nineteenth century 
than before the Civil War, and post-World  War  I1 evidence suggests that the 
random-walk component of real wages is substantial today. 
2.2  Antebellum Wages and Prices 
Surprisingly little is known of the behavior of wages during the antebellum 
period.  Standard nineteenth-century  sources, like the Weeks and Aldrich re- 
ports, concentrate almost entirely on the Northeast, and even then the cover- 
age is spotty.6 Other sources, such as account books, firm records, and census 
5.  Peter Ternin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York, 1969), p.  164. 
6. The Weeks report is Joseph D. Weeks, Reporrs on the Statistics of  Wages in Manufacturing 
Zndustries with Supplementary Reports (Washington, D.C.,  1886). The Aldrich report is Nelson 
W.  Aldrich, Wholesale Prices, Wages, and Transportation, 52nd Congress, 2nd Session, S.R. 70  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
manuscripts,  provide  valuable additional  information  on antebellum wages, 
but are limited to particular locations, occupations, or time periods.’  We use 
a new source, the payroll records of civilian employees of the United States 
Army, which contain wages for various occupations and all parts of the coun- 
try.8 We assume here that the wage rates apply to the private sector and that 
the federal government paid workers the “going wage rate.” The assumption 
is based on the fact that other wages series, derived from a variety of sources, 
track our series for the periods and regions of ove~lap.~ 
Previous work with the sample yielded annual dollar estimates and indices 
of nominal daily wages for artisans (blacksmiths, carpenters, machinists, ma- 
sons, and painters), and laborers (common laborers and teamsters) from 1820 
to  1856, for four census regions  (Northeast,  Midwest, South Atlantic,  and 
South Central).  lo  We  have, in addition, constructed  a new  series-regional 
indices of nominal wages of  clerks. This wage series is, we believe, the first 
for a white-collar  occupation in the antebellum  period.  The nominal  wage 
indices are graphed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and their numerical values are re- 
ported  in  Appendix  A  Tables  2A.1 (artisans), 2A.2  (laborers), and  2A.3 
(clerks). ’  I 
1394 (Washington, D.C., 1893). Philip R. P.  Coehlo and James F.  Shepherd, “Regional Differ- 
ences in Real Wages: The United States, 1851-1880,” Explorations in EconomicHistory, 13 (Jan. 
1976). p. 205, point out that the Weeks data “exhibit a high degree of variability before  1860, 
probably due to a scarcity of data for . . . the 1850s.” 
7. See, for example, Robert G. Layer, Earnings of  Cotton Mill Operatives, 1825-1914 (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.,  1955); Walter B. Smith, “Wage Rates on the Erie Canal,” Journal  ofEconomic 
History, 23 (Sept. 1963), pp. 298-31  1; Lebergott, Manpower, pp. 257-333;  Donald R. Adams, 
Jr.,  “Wage Rates in the Early National Period: Philadelphia,  1785-1830,”  Journal of  Economic 
History, 28 (Sept. 1968). pp. 404-26;  Jeffrey Zabler, “Further Evidence on American Wage Dif- 
ferentials,” Explorations in Economic History, 10 (Fall 1972). pp. 109-17; Donald R. Adams, Jr., 
“The Standard of  Living During American Industrialization: Evidence from the Brandywine Re- 
gion, 1800-1860,” Journal of  Economic History, 42 (Dec.  1982), pp. 903-17;  “Prices and Wages 
in Maryland, 1750-1850,” Journal ofEconomic History, 46 (Sept.  1986). pp. 625-45;  and Ken- 
neth Sokoloff, “The Puzzling Record of Real Wage Growth in Early Industrial America,  1820- 
1860’  (manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles, 1986). See also Kenneth Sokoloff and 
Georgia Villaflor, chap. 1 in this volume. 
8. The collection is known as the “Reports of Persons and Articles Hired, 1818-1905,”  Record 
Group 92, National Archives. For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of the “Reports,” see 
Robert A. Margo and Georgia C. Villaflor, “The Growth of Wages in Antebellum America: New 
Evidence,” Journal ofEconomic History, 47 (Dec. 1987), pp. 873-95. 
9. See the discussion  in  Margo and Villaflor, “The Growth of  Wages”; also see Robert A. 
Margo,  “Wages and Prices before the Civil War: A  Survey and New Evidence,” in Robert E. 
Gallman and John Wallis, eds., American Economic Growth and the Standard of  Living Before 
the Civil War (Chicago, 1992, forthcoming). Also, Wilentz, Chants Democratic  (p. 419, figure 
5) has data for masons and laborers in New York City over the 1835 to 1845 period that reasonably 
track those here for the Northeast. 
10. The annual dollar estimates are in Margo and Villaflor, “The Growth of  Wages,” pp. 893- 
95. The annual indices are presented in Robert A. Margo, “Appendix: The Growth of Wages in 
Antebellum America,” Colgate University, Department of  Economics, Discussion Paper no. 88- 
06 (1988). 
11. The construction of  the annual dollar estimates involves the weighting of  within-region 
wage estimates, while the construction of  the  indices does not; see Margo and Villaflor, “The Fig. 2.1 
Midwest Regions 
Notes: 1856 = 100 for all indices. Shaded areas are peak-to-trough periods of the NBER business cycle. The year 1834 begins the 
series and is a trough year. 
Sources: See text. See also Appendix Tables 2A. I-2A.4. 
Price Indices, and Nominal Wage Indices of Laborers, Artisans, and Clerks, in the Northeast and Fig. 2.2  Price Indices, and Nominal Wage Indices of Laborers, Artisans, and Clerks, in the South Atlantic and 
South Central Regions 
Notes: 1856 = 100 for all indices. Shaded areas are peak-to-trough periods of the NBER business cycle. The year 1834 begins the 
series and is a trough year. 
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Because the series for clerks is new, Table 2.1 gives the distribution of clerk 
wage rates by decade and fort location. Approximately two-thirds of the wage 
observations are from forts in the Midwest and the South, and locations in the 
West North Central and West  South Central states are also over-represented 
relative to the share of these regions in the general population. The total num- 
ber of  observations of  clerk wages (6,673) exceeds 20 percent of  the entire 
sample (32,709). Clerks were hired to maintain the forts’ books, and to help 
quartermasters with purchasing and other commercial matters. They were, in 
effect, business managers, and thus the large number of clerks relative to other 
occupations should not be surprising. The vast majority of clerks were hired 
annually; many were employed at particular forts for lengthy periods of time, 
unlike  artisans  or  common  laborers who  were  often  hired  on  a daily  or 
monthly basis. 
The construction of the indices of clerk wages follows the procedure previ- 
ously used for the laborers and artisans. Hedonic regressions are estimated, 
for which the dependent variable is the log of the nominal monthly wage rate. 
The independent variables are dummy variables for the location of  the fort 
(for example, St. Louis), characteristics of the worker associated with espe- 
cially high or low wages (for example, chief clerk, apprentice clerk), whether 
the worker was paid daily, the number of army rations, the season of the year, 
and the time period (single years or groups of  years, for example,  1834 to 
1846).  l2 Separate regressions were estimated for each census region.  l3 
The coefficients of  the time-period dummies are used to estimate annual 
indices of monthly wage rates. Because the dependent variable is measured in 
logs, the coefficients give the percentage difference in wages, controlling for 
other factors and relative to the base year, which is 1856. Let pji be the coeffi- 
cient of the time dummy in thejth year (for example, 1844) for the ith census 
region (for example, the Northeast). Then the nominal wage index, I,,, is 
Antebellum price data, comparable in geographic scope to the wage data, 
are available for only certain commodities and only at the wholesale level. 
Retail price data, as well as data for various goods and services such as hous- 
ing,  are  not  presently  available. We  rely  here  on  the extensive series of 
monthly wholesale prices collected by Arthur Cole and his associates.  l4 
Growth of Wages,” p. 879, and Margo, “Appendix: The Growth of Wages,” p. 4.  Essentially, the 
indices are  constructed under the assumption that changes in wages within regions are the same 
regardless of location,  while the dollar estimates adjust for within-region shifts in population. 
Because the dollar estimates are somewhat sensitive to the weighting scheme used, and because 
our focus in this paper is on changes in wages (not their dollar values), we rely instead on the 
wage indices. 
12. Daily wages are converted to monthly wages using twenty-six days per month. 
13. The regressions are in an appendix, available on request from Robert Margo. 
14. Arthur  Harrison  Cole,  Wholesale Commodity  Prices  in  rhe  Unired Stares,  1700-1861 
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Table 2.1  Distribution of the Wage Rate Sample for Clerks, by Decade and 
Fort Location 
Percent of 






Southern New England 
Northern New England 
New York City 











Ohio, Western Pennsylvania 
Illinois, Indiana 

















183  1-40 




















































































24.3 75  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Table 2.1  (continued) 
Percent of 
Number  Aggregated Total 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana  155  11.9 
New Orleans, Louisiana  154  51.9 
Total  1,302  19.5 
Aggregated total  6,673 
Notes: The unit of observation is a person-month. Percentages may not add to  100 due to round- 
ing. 
Source:  Margo-Villaflor sample  of  “Reports  and  Articles  Hired,” National Archives,  Record 
Group 92. 
The advantage of  the Cole data is that price information is available for 
cities located in each of the census regions.I5 In using these data to construct 
regional price indices we chose commodities widely consumed by  working- 
class households or proxies for finished goods: foods (for example, butter, 
pork), fuels (for example, coal), and clothing (proxied by wholesale prices of 
cotton and leather). We  constructed annual commodity-specific price indices, 
with  1856 as the base year (that is,  1856= 100 for each commodity index). 
The commodity-specific indices were then weighted into overall regional in- 
dices.  l6 
The limitations of the price indices are many.  Fluctuations in retail prices 
need not follow those in wholesale prices, although the fact that the series are 
annual, rather than monthly, should enhance the correspondence. The com- 
modities included cover a large fraction of  household expenditures, but one 
principal commodity-housing-cannot  be included.  The indices presume 
that rural price changes were closely correlated with price changes in the ur- 
ban areas represented in the Cole data. Although the assumption is reasonable 
for the Northeast, its validity cannot be assessed for the other regions.’* 
The price indices are presented in Figure 2.la (also Figure 2.3a) for the 
Northeast and the Midwest regions and Figure 2.2a (also Figure 2.4a) for the 
South Atlantic and South Central regions. The actual data series are in Appen- 
dix Table 2A.4. Price series in all four regions have similar features, although 
that for the Midwest differs during the pre-1840  period. The Midwest was 
15. The cities and associated census regions are New York and Philadelphia (Northeast), Cin- 
16. See  Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of the construction of  the price indices. 
17. The exclusion of housing prices is important, because there is some evidence that the rela- 
tive price of  housing increased in northern cities in the  1850s; see Fogel, Without Consent or 
Contract, p. 356. 
18. See Winifred B. Rothenberg, “The Market and Massachusetts Farmers,” Journal of  Eco- 
nomic History, 41 (June 1981). pp. 283-314,  for a suggestive proof that rural and urban price 
changes were highly correlated during the period. Although see below for evidence that Rothen- 
berg’s price index does not have similar time-series properties to our Northeast price index. 
cinnati (Midwest), Charleston (South Atlantic), and New Orleans (South Central). 76  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
growing rapidly from 1820 to  1840 but  did not become integrated  into the 
national market for goods until around mid-century.  l9 
All four price series have numerous oscillations around a generally declin- 
ing trend.  There are two large deviations,  one considerably larger than  the 
other. The first is the well-known  inflation of  the post-1834  period with the 
subsequent collapse during 1837 and the rapid deflation from  1839 to 1842. 
Prices rose between 25 and 45 percentage points,  depending on the region, 
during the 1834 to 1836/37 period and then plummeted by  well over 40 per- 
centage points during the deflation. Prices began a secular upward trend after 
1842, with a spike in 1847 followed by a substantial decline and then contin- 
ued increase during the years following the California gold rush.  Except  in 
the Midwest, where prices rose  19 percent from the  1820s to the  1850s, the 
long-term trend in prices was basically flat or slightly downward. 
The nominal wage indices for the three occupational groups-laborers  (in- 
cluding teamsters),  artisans, and clerks-are  shown in the remaining panels 
of Figure 2.1 for the Midwest and Northeast regions, and in Figure 2.2 for the 
South Atlantic and South Central regions. The series for laborers and artisans 
have been  examined in detail elsewhere, and we summarize that discussion 
here.  2o 
In the Northeast and Midwest, laborer (nominal) wages are level to around 
1835. They spike, first up and then down, just after 1835, and then display an 
upward movement to  1856. In contrast, laborer wages in the South Atlantic 
first decline, then spike up and down in the  1830s, and end with a decade of 
virtual  stability. Those of the South Central region have upward and down- 
ward  movement  throughout  with no apparent tendency  to mimic  the price 
data. 
The artisan wage series appears distinct from that for laborers in most of 
the regions.  In the Midwest, for which  the  artisan and laborer series seem 
most similar, there are two spikes in the 1830s with secular growth before and 
after. But in the Northeast, while the general trend is similar to that for labor- 
ers, the large changes in the  1830s are absent. Oscillations in the South Cen- 
tral data are more numerous than in the laborer data, although the largest is 
during the period of greatest price fluctuation. The South Atlantic artisan data 
display no apparent relationship to the laborer data nor to the price series. 
Indices of clerk wages are shown in Figure 2. Id for the Midwest and North- 
east, and in Figure 2.2d for the South Atlantic and South Central regions (see 
also Appendix Table 2A.3). In the Northeast and Midwest, clerk wages grew 
more or less continuously during the entire period with no obvious relation- 
ship to the price series. In the two southern regions, however, wages increase 
and then decrease during the 1830s. But the two southern series deviate before 
the 1830s: South Central wages rise while those of the South Atlantic fall. 
19. See, for example, Thomas Senior Berry, Western Prices before 1861, Harvard Economic 
20. See Margo and Villaflor, “The Growth of  Wages in Antebellum America.” 
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In general, nominal wages of clerks increase more rapidly in the 1840s than 
wages of artisans or laborers. As a result, the average annual growth rate of 
clerk wages (1  820 to 1856) exceeds that for other occupations, and differences 
are especially  large in the South. Previous work with  the wage sample for 
artisans and laborers found no evidence of a surge in skill differentials-the 
ratio of artisan to unskilled wages-after  1820, as others have claimed.21  That 
conclusion, however, must now be modified, because it appears that the wages 
of  clerks,  who  were  highly  skilled,  did grow  more rapidly  than  wages  of 
skilled or unskilled labor during the late antebellum period.22 
Indices of real  wages,  based on the nominal  wage and price indices, are 
presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 (also Appendix Tables 2A.5 to 2A.7). Real 
wages grew most among clerks, and they grew more rapidly in the North than 
the South. Real wages grew  less in the  newly settled Midwest than  in the 
established Northeast, but the opposite holds when comparing the South Cen- 
tral and South Atlantic states. In every region real wages grew slowly during 
the 183Os, increased rapidly in the 1840s, and then decreased in the 1850s. 
Real wages of artisans increased by 8 percent from the 1820s to the 1830s 
in the Northeast,  compared with only 3 percent in the Midwest. Real wages 
continued to rise more rapidly in the Northeast  than  in the Midwest in the 
1840s, before falling in both regions in the 1850s. Over the entire period, real 
wages of artisans rose at an average annual rate of 0.8 percent per year in the 
Northeast but at only 0.2 percent per year in the Midwest. Among common 
laborers and teamsters, real wage growth was similarly slow during the 183Os, 
but in both regions real wages rose rapidly in the 1840s before falling some- 
what in the  1850s. Across the entire 35-year period, however, real wages of 
unskilled  labor in the North  grew  more rapidly  than  did the  real  wages of 
artisans.23 
21. The claim was originally made by Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert, American Inequal- 
iryc A Macroeconomic History (New York, 1980), pp. 67-75.  Evidence against the surge hypoth- 
esis-that  skilled wages grew more rapidly than unskilled wages-is  presented in Margo and 
Villaflor, “The Growth of  Wages,” pp. 883-88. 
22. This result is consistent with that in Richard Steckel, “Poverty and Prosperity: A Longitu- 
dinal Study of Wealth Accumulation,  1850-1860  (manuscript, Department of  Economics, Ohio 
State University, 1988), p.  12. Steckel finds that, in terms of relative wealth, white-collar workers 
improved their economic  position  compared  with  blue-collar or unskilled workers during the 
1850s. 
23. When the price indices are applied to the annual dollar estimates of  skilled and unskilled 
wages in Margo and Villaflor, “The Growth of  Wages,” pp. 893-94, the following annual growth 
rates (1821-30 to 185 1-56)  of  real wages are obtained: 
Skilled  Unskilled 
Northeast  0.9  1.2 
Midwest  0.4  1.1 
South Atlantic  0.5  0.3 
South Central  0.7  1 .o 
These growth rates are similar to those in Appendix A, except for those in the Midwest which are 
higher. This difference is a consequence of the weighting procedure used in the construction of 
the dollar estimates; see Margo, “Appendix: The Growth of  Wages,” p. 24. YBY 
Fig. 2.3 
Regions 
Nares: 1856 = 100 for all indices. Shaded areas are pea!-to-trough  periods of the NBER business cycle. The year 1834 begins the 
series and is a trough year. 
Sources: See text. See also Appendix Tables 2A.4-2A.7. 
Price Indices, and Real Wage Indices of Laborers, Artisans, and Clerks, in the Northeast and Midwest Fig. 2.4  Price Indices, and Real Wage Indices of Laborers, Artisans, and Clerks, in the South Atlantic and 
South Central Regions 
Notes: 1856 = 100 for all indices. Shaded areas are peak-to-trough periods of the NBER business cycle. The year 1834 begins the 
series and is a trough year. 
Sources: See text. See also Appendix Tables 2A.4-2A.7. 80  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
Real  wages of artisans in the South Atlantic  region  increased  in the late 
1820s but fell sharply in the late 1830s, so that on average real wages were no 
higher in the  1830s than in the  1820s. As in the two northern  regions, real 
wages rose in the 1840s before falling in the 1850s. Real wages of artisans in 
the  South Central states did not increase on average from the  1820s to the 
1830s, but they rose in the  1840s before falling in the  1850s. Overall, real 
wages grew more rapidly in the South Central states than the South Atlantic 
states, opposite to the pattern in the northern regions. Real wages of common 
laborers and teamsters in the South Atlantic  states fell  14 percent  from the 
1820s to the 1830s, rose sharply in the early 1840s, before falling 18 percent 
in the 1850s from the  1840s average. In the South Central states, real wages 
of unskilled labor grew by 2 percent from the 1820s to the 1830s and rose by 
33 percent in the  1840s, before falling slightly in the  1850s. Over the entire 
period, real wages of unskilled labor rose at 1  .O  percent per year in the South 
Central states, but the growth rate was negative (- 0.08 percent per year) in 
the South Atlantic states. 
The real  wages of clerks in the Northeast and South Central states were 
higher in the 1830s than in the 1820s, but the opposite was true in the Midwest 
and South Atlantic regions. In every region the real wages of clerks increased 
markedly  in the  1840s, before falling again in the  1850s. On average, clerks 
experienced  the  greatest  real  wage  growth  among  the  three  occupational 
groups across the entire 35-year period. 
One feature of the six real-wage graphs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 is the marked 
fluctuation in  real  wages,  particularly  during  the  1840s. Such  fluctuations 
could  arise if  nominal wages were relatively  stable or responded  with a lag 
while prices varied greatly. The question to which we now turn is how rigid 
nominal wages were across the four regions and among the three occupations. 
We  approach  this  through  an  analysis of  the  persistence of  shocks to real 
wages. 
2.3  The Persistence of  Shocks to Real Wages: 
An Econometric Analysis 
The ideal method of distinguishing between the two views of the antebel- 
lum  business  cycle-examining  the  time-series  properties  of  unemploy- 
ment-is  not available to us, because of  data limitations for the nineteenth 
century. As an alternative procedure we examine the persistence of shocks to 
real wages using the real wage series just discussed. 
Studies such as ours typically begin with an assumption that the time path 
of real wages is determined by a combination of real and nominal forces. The 
long-run, or “equilibrium,” wage  is determined  by  real  forces-the  supply 
and demand for labor given the price level. In the short run, however, the real 
wage can deviate from its long-run equilibrium value. For example, if  nomi- 
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their equilibrium level (the opposite may occur for a reduction in prices). The 
shock to real wages may persist, possibly for several periods. Provided long- 
run neutrality holds, however, economic forces are set in motion to return the 
real wage to its equilibrium path. 
We  make use of  two time-series techniques to examine the persistence  of 
shocks to the real wage-parametric  tests for a unit root and a related non- 
parametric technique. A time series x, is termed I( l),  or integrated of  order 1 
(has a unit root), if it can be written in the form 
(2)  B(L)(l -  L)x,  = p + A(L)E, 
where L is the lag operator; B(L)  and A(L)  are polynomials in the lag operator; 
p is a constant,  possibly zero (“drift”); and  E,  is a “white-noise”  process (a 
mean  zero,  finite  variance,  serially uncorrelated  error)  .24  A  random  walk, 
x, = x,-  I  + E,, is the simplest example of an I(  1) series. Shocks to an I(  1) do 
not evaporate, but rather influence all future values; in the case of the random 
walk, note that x, = E,  + E,-  I  + . . . + E~. 
Suppose, instead, that the series x,  were stationary or integrated of  order 0, 
f(0).  Then representation (2)  would exist without the (1 -L) term on the left- 
hand  side, that  is, without first differencing.  An example is a series with a 
constant mean. Alternatively, x,  could be trend-stationary, that is, have a mean 
which follows a deterministic time trend, as in 
(3)  x, = p + pt  + A(L)E,. 
In the case of (3),  shocks eventually die out and the series returns to its long- 
run growth path given by the deterministic trend, E(x, + ,J  = p + k(t + k). 
The antebellum trend in real wages was generally upward, as inspection of 
Figure 2.3 reveals, although there were often large fluctuations around trend. 
Testing representation  (2)  against  (3)  is a first step in determining whether 
annual fluctuations in antebellum real wages had permanent or  merely transi- 
tory effects. Toward this end we estimate regressions of the form 
(4)  (1 -  L)(w/p),  = A(w/p),  = a + pt  + 6(w/p),-,  + E, 
where  (wlp) is the log of  the real  wage.  The null  hypothesis  is that  (wlp) 
follows a random walk with drift, that is, it is f(1) as in x, = x,-, + a + E,. 
We  can reject the null (and accept the hypothesis of trend-stationarity) if  the 
F-statistic for the joint hypothesis p = 6  = 0 is sufficiently large. This pro- 
cedure is known as the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test after its originator~.~~ 
24. The roots of the autoregressive polynomial A(L)  and the moving average polynomial B(L) 
are  assumed to lie outside the  unit circle. Thus the  first-differenced series, (1 - L)x,. will  be 
stationary-the  roots of  A(L) lie outside the  unit circle-and  invertible-the  roots of  B(L) lie 
outside the unit circle. 
25. Lagged terms in  (I -  L)(w/p)  are added to the regression until the residual term approxi- 
mates white noise; see David A. Dickey and Wayne A. Fuller, “Distribution of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root,” Journal of  the American Statistical Association, 74 
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We estimate equation (4) for three occupations in four regions-twelve  re- 
gressions in all. In every case we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
real wages possess  a unit root.26  The existence of  a unit root indicates that 
shocks to antebellum real wages were, to  some extent, permanent.  But the 
test does not reveal  the fraction of  the variability  in real wages that can be 
attributed to the permanent, or “random-walk,”  ~omponent.~’  If  the random- 
walk component were  small, shocks to real wages would  still be primarily 
transitory in the long run. Further, the test reveals nothing about the short-run 
dynamics of wages and prices. 
To  investigate  the size of  the random-walk  component and the short-run 
dynamics of real wages we make use of a non-parametric persistence estima- 
tor suggested by John Cochrane and given by 
The statistic a:  is (l/k) times the variance of  the kth difference of  real wages, 
adjusted for sample size (T = number of observations). Then at is the vari- 
ance of the first difference of real wages.  If real wages were a pure random 
walk,  possibly  with drift, the variance ratio (a~/ai)  would equal one for all 
values of  k. If real wages were the sum of a stationary series and a random 
walk, the variance ratio would approach a constant for large k. The closer the 
constant is to zero, the smaller is the random-walk component of  real wages. 
As a short-run benchmark, we compare the actual variance ratios with the 
hypothetical ratio that would arise if real wages followed a deterministic trend 
plus a white-noise process.28  The greater the deviation between the actual and 
the hypothetical ratio for small values of k, the greater is the short-run persist- 
ence of shocks to real wages. 
The results of  the Cochrane test, as we will term it, for the 1821 to 1856 
period are graphed in Figure 2.5. Each panel is for one of the four regions, 
and in each there are four lines. Three of the lines are for the three occupa- 
tional groups. The fourth is the hypothetical ratio and shows how the variance 
ratio changes with k, the number of years in the lag had there been a determin- 
istic trend plus a white-noise process.z9 
The Cochrane tests reveal that the random-walk component (when k  = 10 
to 15 years) for all three occupations among the four regions was small.3o  But 
shocks to real wages persisted for many years. Even after five years, the vari- 
26. A table containing the test statistics is available from Robert Margo on request. 
27. A series with a unit root can be rewritten as the sum of a pure random walk, possibly with 
drift, and a stationary time series. See John H. Cochrane, “How  Big  is the Random Walk in 
GNP?”, Journal ofPolitical Economy, 96 (Oct. 1988), pp. 893-920. 
28. If (wlp),  = p + pt + E,, then 0: = I/k  X  2a: X  [T/(T -  k  +  I)] and the variance ratio 
is [(Iik)  x T/(T -  k + I)]. 
29. The hypothetical white-noise line depends on the number of observations which differs only 
slightly among the four regions and three occupations. We have drawn the line identical across the 
four panels, and it is thus an approximation for some. 
30. A parametric way of  measuring persistence is to estimate low-order ARMA  (autoregressive, 
moving-average) models of  the first difference of real wages, for example, equation (2). Rewrite 
equation (2) in its moving-average representation 1.4 1 
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Fig. 2.5 
Notes: a:  = l/k  X  the variance of  k-differences of the real wage, adjusted for degrees of freedom. White noise is ui/u: for a 
deterministic trend plus a white-noise process, providing a base-line comparison for the other series. The greater the deviation from 
white noise, the larger the random-walk component. 
Sources: See text. 
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ance ratio is only just below one, the value for the case of a pure random walk, 
in all but the Midwest region. After fifteen years the ratio is highest for clerks 
and generally lowest for laborers in all four regions. 
On the basis of  the Cochrane tests, we conclude that shocks to real wages 
were  mostly  transitory  in  the long  run  (the  random-walk  component  was 
small), but that they were quite persistent in the short run. The Cochrane test 
also suggests the adjustment process was rapid in the Midwest for both labor- 
ers and artisans, was extremely protracted in the South Atlantic region,  and 
was slowest for clerks everywhere. 
Further evidence on the persistence  of  shocks can be found in the upper 
panel of  Figure 2.6, which analyzes real wages of agricultural workers in the 
Northeast,  1821-55,  using data collected by Winifred R~thenberg.~’  We  have 
deflated Rothenberg’s nominal wage series by our Northeast price index and 
by Rothenberg’s agricultural price index  .32 Shocks to agricultural real wages 
appear to have been much less persistent than any of the series in Figure 2.5. 
Also in Figure 2.6, in the lower panel, are Cochrane tests on wages for cotton- 
mill  operatives  from Robert Layer’s  study, which  we  have deflated  by  our 
Northeast price index. Nominal wages for cotton-mill operatives are virtually 
flat over the period, and, not  surprisingly,  real  wages demonstrate extreme 
persistence of shocks. 
We  have also estimated persistence measures for industrial workers in the 
late nineteenth century, during 1870 to  1908 and the subperiod  1870 to  1897, 
but we emphasize the provisional  nature of  these results.?) We find that real 
wage data for the  late nineteenth  century  demonstrate  extreme persistence. 
(2’)  (I -  L)x, = k’ + A’(L)E, 
where A’(L)  = A(L)/B(L)  and k’ = p/E(L).  Let A’(])  = xai, the infinite sum of the moving 
average coefficients of A’(L).  If x, is [(I),  then A’(L)  will converge to a finite and positive limit. 
This limit is the long-run “impulse-response” to a unit “innovation,” or shock in E,.  See J. Camp- 
bell and G. Mankiw, “Are Output Fluctuations Transitory?’,  Quarterly Journal  of  Economics, 
102 (Nov. 1987), pp. 857-80.  For example, if x, were a random walk with drift (x, =  + x,  ,  + E,).  then A’(  I) = 1. Estimates of 8“;  using the SAS PROC ARIMA procedure (available on request 
from Robert Margo) were less than one for all occupations in each region, which is consistent 
with the results of the Cochrane tests, which showed that the random-walk component of  real 
wages was small. 
31. See Winifred Rothenberg, “The Emergence of Farm Labor Markets and the Transformation 
of  the Rural  Economy:  Massachusetts,  1750-1855,”  Journal  of  Economic History,  48 (Sept. 
1988), pp. 537-66. 
32. When we  deflate by  Rothenberg’s agricultural price index (which she calls PI  in  “The 
Emergence of  Farm Labor Markets”), the agricultural real  wage (WWIIPI) is indistinguishable 
from a trend with white noise.  Because our price index is heavily weighted toward agricultural 
commodities, the difference between the two indices seems curious. But Rothenberg apparently 
smoothed her price index with a three-year moving average (see Rothenberg, “The Market and 
Massachusetts Farmers,” p. 31 I), and that procedure could explain the differences in  using her 
agricultural index. 
33. We use the index of average daily wages in all industries (D 574) spliced at 1891 to (average 
weekly hours  X  average hourly earnings) for workers in manufacturing (D 593-94).  The price 
index is the Warren and Pearson wholesale price index for all commodities (E 1) spliced at 1890 
to the Bureau of  Labor Statistics wholesale price index (E  13). All series are from Historical 
Statistics of  the UnitedStates, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960). 85  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
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Notes: a;  = I/k x the variance of k-differences of the real wage, adjusted for degrees of 
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the random-walk component. 
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The period from  1870 to 1897 was one of secular deflation  with one price 
spike during 1880 to 1885 and  several  smaller ones. Deflation,  it appears, 
became  a fact of  economic life, and individuals adjusted their expectations 
accordingly. But gold discoveries in the mid-1  890s led to rapid and unantici- 
pated price increases, and expectations may have been  slow to adjust. Thus 
the persistence of shocks to real wages during 1870 to 1897 appears much like 
that during the antebellum  period.  But the data including the post-1897  era 
distinctly do not. Shocks are as persistent as in a random-walk process for the 
first five years. Recent work using post-World  War  I1 data indicates that the 
persistence displayed by the 1870 to 1908 real wage series is characteristic of 
much of the twentieth century.34  Thus, in comparison with the later data, the 
antebellum  series  demonstrate considerably  less persistence,  and  nominal 
wages appear more flexible in response to shocks. 
Even though  the random-walk  component of  antebellum real  wages  was 
small, it may have been the outcome of either persistent nominal or persistent 
real  If long-run neutrality held, the random-walk component could 
only be the product of real  Previous studies of  long-run neutrality 
using late nineteenth and early twentieth century data provide mixed results. 
Although Joel Mokyr and Stephen DeCanio found no evidence against long- 
run neutrality for the 1861 to 1900 period, Jeffrey Sachs did in his regressions 
for the 1897 to 1929 period.37 
We investigate long-run neutrality by examining the cointegration proper- 
ties of wages, prices, and real GNP per worker.3s Speaking loosely, a collec- 
tion  of  time  series  is cointegrated  if the series are each integrated and the 
components do not drift arbitrarily  apart from one another in the long run. 
The first condition, that concerning cointegration, holds if a linear combina- 
tion of the series is stationary, even if the individual series are  The first 
step is to estimate a “cointegrating” regression 
34. See Kevin Hassett,  “Persistence and Cyclicality in  the Aggregate Labor Market” (manu- 
script, presented to the Labor Workshop, University of  Pennsylvania, Nov. 1988). 
35. By persistent nominal shocks we mean a violation of  long-run neutrality. There is also the 
possibility that price fluctuations permanently altered real variables, which we do not investigate. 
Examples of  real shocks are the introduction of  the factory system, technological change, the 
opening of the Erie Canal, and high levels of immigration in the late 1840s and early 1850s. 
36. In effect, the equilibrium path of real wages was not a deterministic trend, but a stochastic 
trend reflecting the impact of shocks to real variables determining labor supply and demand. 
37. See Joel Mokyr and Stephen DeCanio, “Inflation and the Wage Lag During the American 
Civil War,” Explorarions in Economic History,  14  (Oct. 1977), pp.  31 1-36;  and Jeffrey Sachs, 
“The Changing Cyclical Behavior of Wages and Prices: 1890-1 979,” American Economic Review, 
70 (Mar. 1980), pp. 78-90.  Sachs estimated regressions relating nominal wages to current prices, 
lagged prices, and GNP. He found the sum of  the lagged price coefficients was less than unity, a 
result inconsistent with long-run neutrality. 
38. See Robert F. Engle and C. W.  1. Granger, “Cointegration and Error-Correction: Represen- 
tation, Estimation,  and Testing,” Econometrica, 55 (Mar.  1987), pp. 25 1-76,  and Economerric 
Modelling  Wirh Coinregrated  Variables. special issue of  the Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and 
Statistics, 48 (Aug.  1986). for discussions of cointegration. 
39. Unit root tests of  real wages show that wages and prices do not cointegrate. A test of the 
Gallman-Berry output series (see below) also could not reject the hypothesis that the series pos- 
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for which all (lower-case) variables are in logs. The GNP variable is a combi- 
nation  of Robert Gallman’s  and Thomas Senior Berry’s data for real  gross 
national  product in year t converted into a per-worker  series. The Gallman- 
Berry index, as our spliced series will be called, is assumed to capture “real” 
factors determining the long-run equilibrium growth path of real wages.4o  The 
“cointegrating vector”  (1 - aI - a2)  gives the long-run coefficients of the 
stationary linear c~rnbination.~~ 
Separate regressions are estimated for each of the three occupations in the 
four regions using the annual series reported in Appendix A. Two test statis- 
tics are calculated from the estimated regression residuals:  the cointegrating 
regression Durbin-Watson test statistic (CRDW) and the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller  test  statistic  (ADF). The test  for cointegration  is,  in  effect,  a  test 
whether the regression residuals are ~tationary.~~  As in the Dickey-Fuller test 
described earlier, the null hypothesis  is that the three  series are not cointe- 
grated. The test results appear in Table 2.2. All of the CRDW statistics reject 
the null (accept cointegration) at the 5 percent level. The DF and ADF statis- 
tics are somewhat less conclusive,  but still broadly  support cointegration  of 
wages, prices, and output per worker. 
Interpreted literally, cointegration means that wages, prices, and per capita 
real output “moved together” in the long run. But the price coefficients in the 
cointegrating regressions (a,  in Table 2.2) are substantially less than one, and 
those for clerks are negative in two cases, results that are inconsistent  with 
long-run neutrality  (aI = 1). The price coefficients, however, are not robust 
to the estimating procedure.  An equation regressing prices on wages, rather 
than the reverse,  produces  implied price coefficients that vary  substantially 
and have ranges that include  Because the R2’s  for the cointegrating re- 
gressions are low,  the al’s cannot be estimated with precision. We conclude 
that,  while  there is no evidence against long-run neutrality, there can be no 
definitive  inference  about  the  sources  (nominal  as opposed  to real) of  the 
random-walk component of real wages. 
Having shown that wages, prices, and output per worker were cointegrated, 
our final step is to estimate “error-correction’’ regressions of nominal wages. 
Error correction  refers to the  notion  that the  coefficient 6, in equation (4), 
should be negative if  the three series (wages, prices, and output per worker) 
were cointegrated.  For example, if  real wages were above their equilibrium 
value (a positive residual) in period (t -  l),  then wages should fall in period 1. 
40. Thomas Senior Berry, Production and Popularion since 1789:  Revised GNP Series in Con- 
stant Dollars (Richmond,  1988); and Robert E. Gallman, unpublished data (June 1965). Annual 
labor force estimates for intercensal years  were linearly interpolated  from census benchmarks. 
Census estimates of the labor force are from Thomas Weiss, “Appendix: Estimation of the Ante- 
bellum Labor Force Figures” (manuscript, University of Kansas, May 1990), table A-I. 
41. The cointegrating vector, however, need not be unique; see Engle and Granger, “Cointegra- 
tion and Error Correction.” 
42. Ibid., p. 266, describe the various test statistics for cointegration. 
43. If p is the coefficient on wages in the reverse regression, then a,  = I@. 88  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
Table 2.2  Price Coefficients and Cointegration Tests of Wages, Prices, and Real 
GNP Per Capita, 1821-1856 
Northeast  Midwest  South Atlantic  South Central 
Laborers 
“I  0.060  0.350  0.239  0.140 
CRDW  0.841*  1.555*  0.817*  0.943 
DF  -  2.872**  -4.654*  -2.237  -  3.130* 
ADF  -3.421*  -  2.438  -2.388  -3.263* 
R2  0.434  0.465  0.141  0.258 
Artisans 
“1  0.247  0.486  0.164  0.221 
CRDW  1.047*  0.974*  0.913*  0.902* 
DF  -2.984**  -  3.389*  -  3.095**  -  3.1  16** 
ADF  -  2.246  -  3.188**  -  2.825**  -  3.863* 
R2  0.454  0.473  0.322  6.171 
“I  -0.367  -0.121  0.190  -0.078 
CRDW  I .w*  0.843*  0.432*  0.601 * 
DF  -  3.284**  -  2.756  -  1.861  -  2.258 
ADF  -2.145  -2.012  -2.133  -2.956** 
R2  0.679  0.703  0.221  0.478 
Clerks 
Notes: a,  is the coefficient on the log of prices from the cointegrating regression, 
In  W,  = cto + “;In  P, + “;In  GNP, + p,. 
CRDW is the Durbin-Watson statistic from the above cointegrating regression. DF is the t-statis- 
tic on 6 from the Dickey-Fuller regression 
Ap =  -8p_, + E. 
ADF is the t-statistic on 6 from the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression, 
Ap  = -8~_~  +  PAF-~  +oA~-~+  E’. 
The R,’s  are those from the cointegrating regression. Critical values for CRDW, DF, and ADF 
statistics are from S. G. Hall, “An Application of the Granger and Engle Two-step Estimation 
Procedure to United Kingdom Aggregate Wage Data,” Oxford  Bullerin of  Economics and Statis- 
tics, 48 (Aug. 1986). p. 233. 
*Indicates the test accepts cointegration at the 5% level. 
**Indicates the test accepts cointegration at the 10% level. 
The estimates of 6 were, in fact, negative in all the regressions, and the ma- 
jority were statistically significant. Because the sample sizes are small, the 
specification of the error-correction regressions is parsimonious: 
(7)  (1 -  L)w = a(1 -  L)p + p(1 -  L)gnp + 6e-, + E 
where e-  , is the lagged residual from the cointegrating regressions. The pur- 
pose of  the regressions is to investigate the degree of  contemporaneous re- 
sponsiveness of  wages to nominal Ap and real Agnp shocks, that is, as re- 
vealed by the coefficients a  and p. 
Table 2.3 shows estimated values of a  and p. Although few of the coeffi- 
cients are statistically significant, the majority are positive in sign. For ex- 
ample, a positive productivity shock (Agnp > 0) generally caused nominal 89  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Table 2.3  Error-Correction Regressions: Coefficients  on the Change in the Log 
of Price (Ap)  and the Change in the Log of GNP (Agnp) 
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Note: a  and  p are from regressions of the form given by equation (7): 
(I  -L)w =a(  1 -L)p + p(  I -L)gnp +  6e_,  +  E 
where e is the residual from the cointegrating regression; see Table 2.2. r-statistics are in paren- 
theses. 
wages to increase in the same period. Antebellum wages were “procyclical” 
in this  sense.  Similarly,  a positive  price  shock (Ap > 0) resulted  in higher 
nominal  wages.  The estimates of a,  however, are all substantially less than 
one, implying that contemporaneous  changes in prices  and real wages were 
negatively related. Thus, the persistence of shocks to real wages in the short 
run is largely attributable to the slowness with which nominal wages adjusted 
to changes in the price level. 
2.4  Implications for Antebellum Labor Markets 
Our various  findings,  by  region  and  occupation,  reveal  much  about  the 
functioning of antebellum labor markets and the effects of economic develop- 
ment.  To  reiterate,  our main  finding  is that although  shocks to real  wages 
across all regions  and (nonagricultural)  occupations had  little long-run  per- 
sistence,  there was a substantial short-run  impact.  Agricultural  real wages, 
however, display considerably less persistence. At the two extremes, the Mid- 
west and the South Atlantic were the most anomalous of the regions; the Mid- 
west  having  the  least  persistent,  and  the  South  Atlantic  having  the  most 
persistent, shocks to real wages. Agricultural workers and clerks (also cotton- 
mill operatives) were at the two extremes of the occupations. 
Why did shocks to real wages persist in the short run? Price fluctuations in 
the antebellum period were generally monetary in origin. The United States 90  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
was on a bimetallic standard but had no central bank to sterilize specie nor act 
as a “lender of the last resort” in times of banking crisis. Changes in specie, 
in the British discount rate, and in the cotton market led to sharp changes in 
the price level and often to banking panics.44 
The precise mechanism underlying our results and causing monetary forces 
to  have  real  effects  may  be related  to  Robert  Lucas’s  “signal  processing” 
theory.45  A decrease in the money supply, for instance, is noticed by producers 
as a decrease in the price for their goods. But producers do not know whether 
the price change  is general or relative,  and  they  will  attribute some of  the 
change to each cause. Because they perceive that at least part of the decrease 
is specific to their industry or firm, they  will decrease employment,  invest- 
ment, and other real variables by some amount. They perceive that they can- 
not lower nominal wages by the full amount, because, if part of the change is 
relative, the decrease in wages would lead to an exodus of labor. Because all 
producers lay off some workers, a downturn ensues, and nominal wages even- 
tually do fall. The absence of information,  thus the noisiness  of  the signal, 
causes a purely monetary phenomenon to have real effects. 
Rather than attributing the relationship between the monetary and real phe- 
nomena simply to nominal wage rigidity, Lucas’s signal processing theory is 
an equilibrium theory of adjustment in the face of imperfect information. Be- 
cause the theory is more believable when information is limited, it seems par- 
ticularly  relevant to the nineteenth century when the public was less knowl- 
edgeable about the course of general economic variables. Agents may have 
had more difficulty discerning absolute from relative price changes in indus- 
trialized areas producing a heterogeneous mix of products, such as the North- 
east, than in agricultural regions, such as the Midwest, where the product mix 
was  more homogeneous.  The lower persistence of  shocks in the  Midwest, 
especially among the unskilled,  is also consistent with the view that a larger 
agricultural sector contributed to more flexible labor markets for free workers. 
The more persistent shocks in the Old South, however, appear to contradict 
claims  that  slavery  enhanced  the  spatial  efficiency  of  free  labor  markets, 
thereby inhibiting industrial development in the region.46 
44. See, for example, Temin, The Jacksonian Economy. Recent work on financial crises sug- 
gests that antebellum banking panics could have had persistent effects on real wages. Disruptions 
in the credit mechanism resulting in credit rationing might have reduced the demand for labor, 
causing a reduction in real wages. On the real effects of financial crises, see Ben S. Bernanke, 
“Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,” Amer- 
ican Economic Review, 73 (June 1983), pp. 257-76. 
45. See, for example, Robert Lucas, Studies in Business-Cycle Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 
1981), in particular the reprinted article,  “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” and the 
essay “Understanding Business Cycles.” 
46. See Heywood Fleisig, “Slavery, the Supply of  Agricultural Labor, and the Industrialization 
of the South,”Journal ofEconomic History, 36 (Sept.  1976), pp. 572-97.  Recent work by Gavin 
Wright suggests that inefficient labor markets may have inhibited southern economic growth after 
the Civil War; our results suggest that inefficiencies existed during the antebellum period as well; 
see Gavin Wright, Old South, New South (New York, 1986). 91  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
There is, however, a competing explanation for the behavior of midwestern 
wages.  Land  sales in the Midwest (and South Central regions)  skyrocketed 
during the price inflation of the 1830s. In both regions land sales at the peak 
of  the  land  boom,  in  1836, were  eight  times  their  1830  The land 
boom, according to some, developed because land prices were fixed in nomi- 
nal terms while output prices,  especially cotton,  were rapidly rising.  Land, 
therefore, became an exceptional bargain.4R  Fluctuations in land sales appear 
strikingly similar to those of  prices, although land sales are considerably more 
extreme. The demand  for labor, particularly  unskilled  labor,  may  have in- 
creased with the land boom, thereby producing greater flexibility of wages in 
the  The relationship between prices and nominal wages, therefore, 
may have been intermediated by a third factor-land.  This explanation is ap- 
pealing, but is not entirely consistent with the evidence. Real wages did not 
always increase during the land boom period; further,  nominal wages in the 
South Central region, which also experienced a spectacular land boom, do not 
yield the same results. 
We turn now to the implications of  our findings for the functioning of labor 
markets. Most laborers in the antebellum period were paid by the day or the 
month and did not, it seems, have the explicit or implicit guarantees workers 
have today. Rigid nominal wages in the face of declining prices might then 
imply high levels of unemployment.  If workers were relatively immobile, un- 
employment could have meant prolonged absence of work and wages. Given 
the signal processing model just sketched, price decreases, even if triggered 
by  purely  monetary  phenomena, could have produced  unemployment,  eco- 
nomic  depression,  and, paradoxically,  rising  real  wages  for  those  who re- 
mained employed. Real wages did, in fact, rise during most episodes charac- 
terized  by  labor historians and others as ones of major unemployment,  for 
example,  1839-42  and 1854-55.50 
There is some evidence that workers laid off  during periods of economic 
decline migrated to agricultural areas and later returned to their original em- 
ployment when conditions impr~ved.~’  Thus unemployment in the industrial 
47. See the appendix in Stanley Lebergott, “The Demand for Land: The United States, 1820- 
1860,” Journal of Economic History, 45 (June 1989,  pp.  181-212. 
48. See, for example, Temin, The Jacksonian Economy. It should also be noted that land be- 
came easier to purchase after 1832, when an  act was passed which reduced the minimum acreage. 
49. Because the price index does not include the cost of housing (which would have risen during 
the land boom), it is also possible that our real wage index overstates the flexibility of midwestern 
wages. 
50. Layer, Earnings of  Cotton Mill Operatives, notes employment was reduced during 1834, 
1837, 1842, 1850, 1856. The episodes given are from Wilentz, ChantsDemocratic. 
5 I. Alan Dawley, in Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution  in Lynn (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1976), writes that “manufacturers . . . hired a large number of people to get the job done, 
and then laid off  most of the employees when the orders were filled. . . . When the shoe industry 
expanded, new job opportunities attracted migrants to the city, and when it retrenched the inflow 
stopped. The boom of the 1830s came to an abrupt halt in  1837; for the next several years Lynn 
experienced an outright decline in population; then business revival in the mid-1  840s brought 
renewed population growth” (p. 53). 92  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
sector may have been less severe than various historical accounts suggest. But 
migration from urban and industrial areas could have exacerbated the adjust- 
ment by preventing firms from observing the signal of general unemployment. 
Price inflation, by similar reasoning, produced decreased real earnings and 
an increased demand  for labor.  Historically,  labor unrest  and  strikes in the 
Northeast  are easily linked  to these episodes; important strikes occurred in 
virtually all the inflationary periods, for example, 1824-25,  1835-36,  1844- 
45, and  1853-54.  According to the standard count of strikes between  1833 
and 1837, when the price level rose sharply, the vast majority involved skilled 
workers in the Northeast; very few took place among the unskilled or in other 
regions.52  Although striking for higher wages was not “the journeyman’s sole 
or  even major concern,” there is no question that labor agitation was “clearly 
linked to the inflationary spiral.”53  Although persistence of shocks was some- 
what diminished for northeastern artisans, compared with those in other re- 
gions, collective action did not greatly reduce it. 
The persistence of shocks to clerks’ wages is consistent with their relatively 
high  degree of  skill and the nature of  white-collar  work during the period. 
Often employed for long period of time at the same firm, there was less need 
for white-collar workers to resort to strikes and union activity, since real wage 
losses during inflationary  periods would be balanced  by gains during defla- 
tionary episodes. 
Economic historians have long debated whether the existence of a wage lag 
helped  finance the Union war effort during the Civil War.54 An  econometric 
study by Mokyr and DeCanio, using methods different from ours, concluded 
that  a  wage  lag did exist  during  the  Civil War,  but  they  did  not  consider 
whether the lag was peculiar to the war period.55  Our results suggest that the 
wage lag may have been a pervasive feature of American labor markets long 
before the Civil War and that it increased over time. 
2.5  Summary 
We have presented an econometric analysis of the persistence of shocks to 
real wages before the Civil War.  The results  suggest that the revisionist de- 
scription  of  antebellum  labor  markets  has  merit.  We  found  no  evidence 
against the view that changes in prices were eventually reflected fully in nom- 
52. Commons, et al., History of  Labor, vol. I,  pp. 478-84 contains the list of strikes between 
I833  and 1837. 
53.  Wilentz, Chanrs Democratic, p. 231.  Wilentz also notes that a strike by journeyman cabi- 
netmakers in 1835  was motivated by the fact that “the price book [for standard journeyman wages] 
used by their masters was more than a quarter of a century old. . . . The old book failed to keep 
up with the cost of living” (p. 232). 
54.  The wage-lag hypothesis was first articulated by  Wesley Clair Mitchell, A History of  the 
Greenbacks (Chicago, 1903). Mitchell’s hypothesis was criticized by, among others, R. A. Kessel 
and A. A. Alchian, “Real  Wages in  the North  During the Civil  War: Mitchell’s  Data  Reinter- 
preted,” Journal ofLaw and Economics, 2 (Oct. 1959), pp. 95-1  13. 
55.  Mokyr and DeCanio, “Inflation and the Wage Lag During the American Civil War.” 93  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
inal wages, controlling for real factors. In the short run, however, shocks to 
real wages had persistent effects. Real wages generally fell during periods of 
inflation  and  rose  during  periods  of  deflation.  Antebellum  deflations  went 
hand in hand with recession or  depression,  and almost all involved episodes 
of  reduced  employment in  industry  and urban  areas.  Only fully  employed 
workers, therefore,  benefited from real wage growth during deflations.  0th- 
ers, it seems, were either out of work or migrated to agriculture. The emphasis 
labor historians have given to the wage lag in explaining labor strife, and in 
accounting for the importance of inconstant employment in working class cul- 
ture and politics,  seems deserved. But the flexibility of the antebellum labor 
force and the role of the agricultural hinterland in shielding labor from unem- 
ployment requires further investigation. Appendix A 
Table 2A.1  Indices of Nominal Wages of Artisans, 1820-1856 
~  ~ 











































































Decadal averages (1821-30 =  100): 
1821-30  100.0 
1831-40  113.1 
184140  111.5 
1851-56  125.2 































































































































Notes: See also Appendix B for a procedure to convert the wage indices to wage levels. 
Source; Margo-Villaflor sample of  “Reports and  Articles Hired,” National  Archives, Record 
Group 92. 
n.a. = not available. 
”Rate  of growth is the average annual rate of  growth, 1821-30 to 1851-56. 95  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Table 2A.2 
Year  Northeast  Midwest  South Atlantic  South Central 











































































Decadal averages (1821-30 =  100): 
1821-30  100.0 
183140  108.3 
184140  119.5 
1851-56  137.6 































































































































Notes: See also Appendix B for a procedure to convert the wage indices to wage levels. 
Source: Margo-Villaflor sample of  “Reports and  Articles  Hired,” National Archives,  Record 
Group 92. 
n.a.  = not available. 
‘Rate of growth is the average annual rate of growth,  1821-30  to 1851-56. 96  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
Table 2A.3  Indices of Nominal Wages of Clerks, 1820-1856 











































































Deradal averages (1821-30= 100): 
182 1-30  100.0 
183140  113.4 
184140  144.6 
1851-56  153.0 































































































































Notes: See also Appendix B for a procedure to  convert the wage indices to wage levels. 
Source: Margo-Villaflor  sample of  “Reports  and  Articles  Hired,”  National  Archives,  Record 
Group 92. 
n.a. = not available. 
“Rate of  growth is  the average annual rate of growth, 1821-30  to 1851-56. 97  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Table 2A.4  mice Indices, 1821-1856 









































































Decadal averages (1821-30 =  100): 
182 1-30  100.0 
183  140  104.2 
184140  78.8 
1851-56  98.0 




























































































































Source; See Appendix B and text. 
’Rate of  growth is the average annual rate of growth, 1821-30  to  1851-56. 98  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
Table 2A.5 
Year  Northeast  Midwest  South Atlantic  South Central 









































































Decadal averages (1821-30= 100): 
1821-30  100.0 
183140  108.2 
184140  141.2 
1851-56  126.7 




























































































































Sources: Tables 2A.1 and 2A.4. 
n.a. = not available. 
"ate  of growth is the average annual rate of growth, 1821-30  to  1851-56. 99  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Table 2A.6  Indices of Real Wages of Laborers, 1821-1856 
~~ 









































































Decadal averages (1821-30 =  100): 
1821-30  100.0 
183140  103.1 
184140  152.5 
1851-56  139.9 




























































































































Sources: Tables 2A.2 and 2A.4. 
n.a. = not available. 
'Rate of growth is the average annual rate of  growth, 1821-30  to 1851-56. 100  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
Table 2A.7  Indices of Real Wages of Clerks, 1821-1856 









































































Decadal averages (1821-30= 100): 
1821-30  100.0 
183140  108.6 
184 1-40.  183.4 
1851-56  155.8 




























































































































Sources: Tables 2A.3 and 2A.4. 
*Rate  of  growth is the average annual rate of  growth, 1821-30  to 1851-56 101  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
Appendix B 
Construction of  the Wage and Regional Price Indices 
Wage Indices 
The nominal wage indices in Tables 2A.1-2A.3  are constructed so that 
1856 =  100, and therefore cannot be used to compute skill differentials or 
ratios. The following are a set of nominal wages for 1856 that can be used to 
produce nominal wages for all years. 
Northeast  Midwest  South Atlantic  South Central 
Artisans  1.91  2.21  1.74  1.91 
Laborers  1.26  1.36  1.02  1.22 
Clerks  2.14  2.21  2.35  2.52 
Nores: Artisans includes carpenters, painters and plasterers, blacksmiths and machinists. Labor- 
ers includes common laborers and teamsters. Clerks includes inspectors and foragers. 
Because the wages analyzed here havz been computed using a hedonic regres- 
sion, those given above for 1856 depend on the weights placed on the coeffi- 
cients. The procedure used is as follows. The coefficients from the hedonic 
wage regression for the fort and occupation dummies were weighted by  the 
sample shares (e.g., the coefficient of the fort dummy for Detroit in the Mid- 
west laborer regression was weighted by  the share of observations from De- 
troit). Coefficients of the seasonal dummies were each weighted by  %I,  and all 
other variables were set equal to zero. The estimates, therefore, can be inter- 
preted as the daily wage (without rations) in the particular occupational group 
in 1856 averaged across forts in the region and across seasons. 
To produce similar estimates for other years, multiply the wage estimate for 
1856 by the index numbers reported in the appendix tables and divide by  100. 
For example, the index number for clerks in the Northeast in 1840 is 87.8. 
Thus the estimated clerks’ wage at Northeast forts in  1840 is $1.88 ( = $2.14 
x  0.878). We  emphasize, however, that wage estimates for artisans and la- 
borers produced  in  this  manner are not comparable to those in  Robert A. 
Margo and Georgia C. Villaflor, “The Growth of Wages in Antebellum Amer- 
ica: New Evidence,” Journal of  Economic History, 47 (Dec. 1987), pp. 873- 
95, because they were produced using a different weighting procedure than 
that just described. 
Price Indices 
For each census region a set of commodities was selected from Arthur H. 
Cole’s compendium of price data. Average annual prices were calculated, and 
commodity-specific indices were  formed (base year is  1856) in  the  usual 
manner. The regional price indices are geometric weighted averages of  the 
commodity-specific indices:56 
56. See Cole, Wholesale Prices. Although geometric weighted-average price indices are theo- 
retically inferior to other functional forms, the information required to calculate more complicated 102  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 
P  =  rI,p,;(I) 
where pi,  is the value of the commodity-specific index in year t, and the s(i)’s 
are weights. The weights are analogous to budget shares and are derived from 
Ethel Hoover’s study of  consumer prices.s7 Using the Carroll Wright sample 
of  Massachusetts  families, Hoover divided household expenditures into nine 
categories. For six of these categories (cereal and bakery products, meat and 
fish, dairy, other foods, clothing, and fuel), prices could be found in the Cole 
collection  for commodities within  each  category.  The Cole collection  also 
contains price quotations for a tenth group, liquor, which Hoover did not in- 
clude in her consumer price index.58 commodity-specific indices were then 
calculated and weights assigned to each index depending on the relative bud- 
get shares within categories. 
To take a specific example, consider the category “cereal and bakery prod- 
ucts’’ for the Northeast. The Cole collection contains prices for three commod- 
ities within this group-flour,  cornmeal, and rice-for  New York  and Phila- 
delphia. According to Hoover’s calculations, flour accounted for 88 percent 
of  all cereal and bakery expenditures on flour, cornmeal, and rice; the other 
relative shares are: cornmeal (0.  lo), rice (0.02). Cereal and bakery products, 
according to Hoover, made up 10.8 percent of all household expenditures, and 
expenditures on the seven groups represented were 70.7 percent of  all house- 
hold expenditures.  Thus the Northeast weight for flour (see below) is 0.134 
(0.88 X  0.108/0.707). The remaining weights, listed below, were derived in 
a similar manner. 
It is important to note that the South Atlantic index is the least satisfactory. 
The Cole collection  contains no usable  data  for fuel prices  for Charleston 
(either coal or wood) covering the entire period. Furthermore, the “meats and 
fish” and “clothing” categories cover only a single commodity each (bacon 
and cotton, respectively).  If prices for these commodities evolved in a differ- 
ent way than for the other commodities in the category,  the regional  index 
may be biased.  Investigating  such biases would require the collection of  ad- 
ditional price data, which is beyond our scope here. 
indices is not available. Furthermore, a geometric index would appear to be more consonant with 
consumer theory than, for example, an algebraic weighted-average. Specifically, the geometric 
average is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, while an algebraic index is inconsistent 
with utility maximization. On price indices in general see W.  E. Diewert, “Index Numbers,” in J. 
Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P.  Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary ofEconomics, vol. 
2 (New York,  1987), pp. 767-80. 
57. Ethel D. Hoover, “Retail Prices After  1850,” in Conference on Research in Income and 
Wealth, vol. 24, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenrh Century (Princeton,  1960). 
pp. 177-78. 
58. The budget share for liquor (0.02 of total consumer expenditures) is assumed to be the same 
for all regions and is derived from regressions in Michael Haines, “Consumer Behavior and Im- 
migrant Assimilation: A Comparison of  the United States, Britain,  and Germany,  188911 890’ 
(manuscript, Department of Economics, Wayne State University, Jan.  1988). 103  Wages, Prices, and Labor Markets before the Civil War 
1. Northeast, commodities and weights: 
1.1  Cereal and bakery products: flour (0.134), cornmeal (0.015), 
rice (0.003) 
1.2  Meats and fish: beef (0.113), pork (0.024), bacon (0.026), 
fish (0.024) 
1.3  Dairy: butter (0.130) 
1.4  Other foods: molasses (0.003), coffee (0.067), tea (0.022), 
1.5  Clothing: cotton (0.156), leather (0.054) 
1.6  Fuel: coal (0.098) 
1.7  Liquor: whiskey (0.028) 
Percent of  household expenditure accounted for by  above commodities 
lard (0.025), sugar (0.075) 
= 70.7%59 
2.  Midwest, commodities and weights: 
2.1  Cereal and bakery products: 
2.2  Meats and fish: pork (0.087), bacon (0.102) 
2.3  Dairy: butter (0.130) 
2.4  Other foods: coffee (0.075), sugar (0.085),  lard (0.029), 
2.5  Clothing: cotton (0.156), leather (0.054) 
2.6  Fuel: coal (0.098) 
2.7  Liquor: whiskey (0.028) 
Percent of  household expenditure accounted for by  above commodities 
flour (0.150), rice (0.003). 
molasses (0.004) 
= 70.7% 
3.  South Atlantic, commodities and weights: 
3.1  Cereal and bakery products: flour (0.167), rice (0.003) 
3.2  Meats and fish: bacon (0.209) 
3.3  Dairy: butter (0.144) 
3.4  Other foods: coffee (0.083), lard (0.032), sugar (0.094), 
3.5  Clothing: cotton (0.233) 
3.6  Liquor: (0.031) 
Percent of  household expenditure accounted for by  above commodities 
= 65.1% 
molasses (0.004) 
59. Of the expenditures of a typical  antebellum household, 70.7 percent were  on the listed 
commodities, in all but the South Atlantic region. The major excluded commodity is housing, for 
which there is no information in Cole’s collection. For  the South Atlantic, the commodities in- 
cluded account for slightly less of total expenditure. 104  Claudia Goldin and Robert A. Margo 




4.3  Dairy: butter (0.130) 
4.4  Other foods: coffee (0.067), tea (0.022), sugar (0.075), 
4.5  Clothing: cotton (0.21 1) 
4.6  Fuel: wood (0.098) 
4.7  Liquor: whiskey (0.028) 
Percent of household expenditure accounted for by  above commodities 
Cereal and bakery products: flour (0.150), rice (0.003) 
Meats and fish: beef (0.113), pork (0.024), bacon (0.026), 
lard (0.025),  molasses (0.003) 
= 70.7% 